Williams argues that his contemporaries’rationalistic assumptions about morality are a fallacy, and for this reason, he attempts to construct an emotionalism ethics based on“shame”. On the one hand, Williams examines the culture of shame in ancient Greek ethical thought and contrasts it with“guilt”in modern moral phi? losophy, trying to base morality on“shame”as a universal human moral emotion. In addition, he further ex? tends“shame”to the field of public life, exploring in depth the two aspects of social justice and the state of hu? man interaction, trying to prove that“shame”is also an important foundation of public morality. However, in real life, human emotions are often very complex, and the discourse space covered by the concepts of“shame” and“guilt”is not as clear-cut as Williams emphasizes. And by completely rejecting reason, the emotion of shame can hardly be the basis of moral solidity alone.