From the point of view of moral hazard control, the paper analyzes the optimal contract under the con? dition of complete information and moral hazard neutral, and then designs the incentive contract through the rea? sonable benefit distribution mechanism of virtual enterprise. It is found that, without considering moral hazard, under the condition of complete information, the leader enterprises need to pay a certain cost to encourage the positive efforts of the alliance enterprises. As a result, the increase of the effort level will greatly improve the production level; in the case of moral hazard neutral, although the effort level of the alliance enterprises may not be monitored by the alliance enterprises or supervision agencies, the moral hazard insurance will not be an ob? stacle to the development of virtual enterprise, so the optimal interval incentive method can be used; the design process of incentive contract is based on the information collection of the buyer and the seller. The information collection helps to judge the risk preference of the buyer, and then determine the division of labor within the vir? tual enterprise and how to create the contract incentive. The results show that in the design process of incentive contract, the choice of contract model and the trade-off between contract cost and benefit are the core and keys of the design.