Our government has made efforts to cultivate cross-border e-commerce into a new form of foreign trade through frequent industrial support policies. Considering the incentive effect of the favorable government policies on the cross-border export e-commerce supply chain and the self-demand for the improvement of the sup? ply chain revenue, as well as considering the factors of government subsidies and service level, this paper con? structs a supply chain game model including export manufacturing enterprises and cross-border e-commerce en? terprises, and discusses the optimal decision of price, transaction volume, service level and profit of the cross_x005fborder export e-commerce supply chain, which are demonstrated by arithmetic examples. The research shows that when the proportion of government subsidies is at a low level, the implementation of transaction volume subsidy strategy is more helpful than service level subsidy strategy to improve the transaction volume, service level and profits of each entity in the supply chain. while the opposite is true when the government subsidy ratio is at a high level.